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Résumé: Empiriquement, on observe que la majorité des Etats a fait le choix d'un système 
d'imposition progressif. Pourtant, le fondement théorique de ce choix n'est pas 
évident. Si l'on interprète le système d'imposition appliquée comme le résultat 
d'un jeu entre deux partis politiques Downsiens, le fait que la majorité de la 
population soit relativement pauvre permet de conforter l'observation empirique. 
Cependant, des résultats théoriques récents montrent que, à l'équilibre, des 
électeurs purement égoïstes ne font pas toujours ce choix-là.  
Cet article tente de raffiner ces derniers modèles théoriques pour proposer une 
autre explication au choix d'un système progressif. Notre thèse est la suivante : la 
présence d'évasion fiscale - caractéristique importante des systèmes d'imposition 
sur le revenu - a des effets sur l'équilibre du jeu politique en modifiant les 
préférences des individus les plus riches de la société. Dans un premier temps, 
l'ensemble des équilibres en stratégies mixtes du jeu est caractérisé (pour des 
systèmes d'imposition de type quadratique), et on montre alors que l'évasion 
fiscale renforce l'élection de systèmes progressifs d'imposition. Dans un deuxième 
temps, on analyse un cas de système d'imposition de type "wiggling" en montrant 
que l'évasion fiscale mène, quand elle est suffisamment importante, à l'élection 
de systèmes progressifs d'imposition avec certitude.   
 
Abstract: Different theories have attempted to explain why contemporary societies have 
adopted marginal-rate progressive taxation schemes. One possible way of 
justifying this fact is to interpret the choice of a taxation scheme as the outcome 
of a political game between two office-seeking Downsian political parties. One can 
think that in such a game the existence of a majority of relatively poor voters will 
be enough to justify this choice. However, recent results show that at equilibrium 
self-interested voters do not always choose marginal-rate progressive taxation 
schemes in this game. We provide a refinement of the basic theory by introducing 
tax avoidance and showing how it affects the equilibrium outcome of the political 
game. We first characterize the set of mixed-strategy equilibria of the game in 
the case of quadratic taxation schemes, showing that tax avoidance enhances the 
election of marginal-rate progressive tax schemes. Second, we analyse a 
``wiggling" taxes' case proving that tax avoidance leads, when ``efficient" enough, 
to the election of progressive taxation schemes with probability one.      
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Equilibre en stratégies mixtes. 
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1 Introduction
As pointed out by Roemer (1998), “the framers of the US constitution” believed that, if
universal suffrage was introduced, the poor would soon expropriate the rich. If this were
true, democratic societies with such a suffrage would have set up an income tax schedule
with a nil tax rate for the poor voters (citizens with an income lower than the mean) and
a tax rate equal to one for the rich ones, as the former constitute a large majority of the
population.
As a matter of fact, income tax schedules are in practice marginal-rate progressive
and this expropriation has not taken place, even if universal suffrage is widely applied in
contemporary societies. Different theories have been proposed to justify this feature of
taxation schemes. One possible way to study this phenomenon is to interpret the taxation
scheme as the outcome of a political-economic model. In such a model, the choice of
the taxation scheme is determined by the electoral incentives of office-seeking political
parties. This theory - called sometimes “positive theory of income taxation” - is based
on the assumption that each political party proposes different tax schedules and self-
interested voters choose their preferred one. Therefore, at equilibrium, political parties
have an incentive to propose taxation schemes which maximize popular support.
However, the theory is still quite inconclusive regarding the progressivity of taxation
schemes. Marhuenda and Ortun˜o Ort´ın (1995) ([10]) show that if the median income
is below the mean income of the population, then any concave tax scheme obtains less
popular support than any convex tax scheme provided that the latter treats the poorest
agent no worse than the former. However, this theorem does not give much information
concerning the set of equilibria of the political game. This fact implies that this theorem
is not helpful to escape from voting cycles (see Hindriks (2001)).
In the literature, there has been several approaches to determine the structure of the
equilibria of this political game. One of the main difficulties is the lack of existence
of a Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium as stated by Myerson (1993). Indeed, in political
environments, only Pure strategy equilibria were considered as conceptually acceptable.
However, the novel interpretation of electoral mixed strategies, stated by Laslier (2000),
paved the way for the study of the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Under this
approach, a mixed strategy profile in a two-party game can be interpreted as reflecting
the parties’ platform, where the probability that a policy alternative is offered equals the
fraction of voters identifying a party with this alternative. In this sense, we could say that
“ambiguity is a rational behavior for the parties”. Among this strand of the literature,
we can refer to De Donder (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Laslier and Picard (2002),
Roberson (2006), Kvasov (2007) and Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2007).
Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007) ([3]) study the taxation schemes that arise at equilib-
rium from electoral competition between two Downsian parties. [3] make two fundamental
contributions to this field. They first show that if political parties restrict the proposed
tax schemes to progressive and regressive ones then progressive taxation is proposed with
probability one. More formally, they show that the set of mixed strategy equilibria lies
within the set of marginal-progressive tax schemes under this restriction. Secondly they
claim that, when this restriction is softened, the equilibrium outcome does not consist of
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progressive taxation schemes anymore. They also provide an example where, at equilib-
rium, regressive taxes are more likely to be elected than progressive ones. This example
is based on the introduction of what they call “wiggling” taxes. “Wiggling” taxes can
be understood as tax schedules that are neither progressive nor regressive. Their main
conclusion is that “majority support of progressive taxation cannot be only due to the
majority of the population being relatively poor”. Finally, [3] suggest looking for some
other reasons to justify this claim.
In the present work, we take part in this debate by suggesting that tax avoidance could
be one of the missing arguments to justify this empirically verified fact. Tax avoidance
can be defined as the wide variety of activities people engage in where the only purpose
is to lower the individual tax burden. Not much attention has been paid to it in the
literature on voting over income taxation. To our knowledge, only one paper deals with
this phenomenon. Roine (2006) ([13]) studies the effects of tax avoidance when voting over
a linear tax scheme. When tax avoidance is taken into account, he shows that a plethora
of political equilibria can emerge and that if tax avoidance is effective enough, a coalition
of the poor and the very richest individuals can favor a higher tax rate.
According to [13], tax avoidance represents 2 to 7% of GDP; and 5 to 20 % of the
population avoid 10 to 20% of their official tax payments. [13] also estimates that the
share of total income which is not taxed due to tax avoidance is close to 4.6 %. These
estimations are in line with classic estimates but not in line with Feldstein (1999) who
estimates a deadweight loss of as much as 30 % from using a tax on labor income instead
of a lump-sum transfer. Although judging which of these estimates is correct is out of the
scope of this paper, we have decided to use [13]’s estimates which are significantly lower.
This choice is not random and, indeed, using [4]’s ones will strengthen our results as we
will show throughout.
Tax avoidance can be understood in two ways: either as a change on the preferences
of the richest individuals or as some kind of distortion in the payoffs of the political game.
We show that it enhances popular support for progressive taxation. We assume that there
is a continuum of individuals which differ in endowed income. These individuals face two
decisions: how to vote and whether to avoid taxes or not. We assume voters are self-
interested and maximize their after-tax income. To keep things simple, the available tax
schemes are the quadratic ones. We first show (Section 2) that the popular support for
progressive taxation increases with the presence of tax avoidance. Following on from this
result, Section 3 provides a characterization result of mixed strategy Nash equilibria that
arise in the political game when taxes are quadratic. Finally, we study the counterexam-
ple with the “wiggling” tax under tax avoidance. We show that (Section 4), when tax
avoidance is efficient enough, progressive taxation scheme is elected with probability one
at equilibrium.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy with a continuum of individuals. Individuals differ in
endowed income, x ∈ [0, 1], which is distributed according to a distribution function F .
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The function F is such that the median incomem = F−1(12) is lower than the mean income
µ =
∫ 1
0 xdF . Furthermore, F is assumed to be an increasing and differentiable continuous
function with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. By definition, pF denotes the Lebesgue-Stieltjes
probability measure induced by F on [0,1], i.e. pF (S) =
∫
S dF for any S ⊆ [0, 1].
We shall assume here that, given F ∈ F , tax functions are designed to collect an
exogenously given amount of tax revenue 0 < r < µ.
A map t ∈ C [0, 1] is a tax scheme if it satisfies the following two properties:
• 0 ≤ t(x) ≤ x for all x
• x 7−→ t(x) and x 7−→ x− t(x) are increasing maps on [0,1]
The set of tax schemes is denoted by T . The set of quadratic tax functions Q is a subset
of T , defined by T ⊃ Q = {t ∈ T | t(x) = ax2 + bx and a 6= 0}. The set Q can be divided
as follows
Q = P ∪R
where P = {t ∈ Q | t is convex} and R = {t ∈ Q | t is concave}.
As we shall see, due to the existence of some tax avoidance technology, taxpayers do
not “really” face the same tax schemes, or at least, do not have the same preferences over
them.
2.1 A simple individual decision concerning tax avoidance
Individuals in this economy face two decisions. A political decision on how to vote in the
majority election that determines the tax rate, and a binary choice as far as tax avoidance
is concerned.
Indeed, individuals’ objective is to maximize their after-tax income x− t(x). However,
individuals can avoid declaring a share (1-δ), δ ∈ [0, 1], of their taxable income through
investing a lump-sum A ∈ [0, 1] in tax avoidance. The option to invest in tax avoidance is
available to everyone, and the parameters describing the avoidance technology (A, δ) are
assumed to be exogenously given. The aim of this work is to determine the existence of
equilibria of this simple voting game and to evaluate the effects of tax avoidance in the
set of equilibria1. This assumes that the government does not know the true parameters
of (A, δ). This assumption even if not perfectly realistic, captures the intuition that tax
administration cannot restructure legal schemes in order to eliminate tax avoidance.
As will be shown, the main effect of tax avoidance is to enhance the popular support
for progressive taxation schemes. Indeed, the presence of a tax avoidance system implies
that individuals in the highest quantile of income have a tendency to vote for progressive
rather than for regressive taxation schemes.
Following [13], assuming that the avoidance decision can be taken at any point in time,
while the election date is fixed, implies that it is made in response to the electoral outcome.
Given this sequence, the optimal avoidance decision is simple. For any given tax rate, an
1Thus, it seems quite natural to adopt a framework similar to the one used in [3] to ensure the existence
of equilibrium in the case without tax avoidance
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individual chooses to invest in tax avoidance if that choice results in higher utility than
paying full taxes, that is if
x− t(δx)−A > x− t(x)
Thus, we can give a formal definition of the critical income xt as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Critical Income) Given F ∈ F , let (A, δ) represent the tax avoidance
possibilities in the economy. Let t(x) represent the taxation scheme faced by individuals.
We define the critical income xt as the minimum income which is the solution to the
indifference condition. Formally,
xt ≡ min
x∈[0,1]
t(x)− t(δx) = A
This formula can be interpreted as follows. The critical income (or income threshold) xt is
the income level where the entry cost to tax avoidance equals the utility gain of avoiding
taxes.
Thus, the tax scheme the individual faces is
t∗(x) =
{
t(x) if x ≤ xt
A+ t(δx) if x > xt
When tax avoidance is taken into consideration, there are two types of taxation sys-
tems: the ones which are proposed to voters by political parties, denoted for instance by
t, and the ones that voters really face and therefore express their opinion about, denoted
with the same symbol with the superscript (*), i.e. t∗.
We denote by E an element of E , the taxation environment which consists on the
following set
E = {(F, r,A, δ) : F ∈ F , 0 < r < µ, (A, δ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]}
where F denotes the set of admissible distribution functions.
Modelling tax avoidance One of the main drawbacks of the way we introduce tax
avoidance in this model is its simplicity. One could argue that this simple binary choice
does not really mimic the tax avoidance behaviour. This modelling of tax avoidance is
extensively discussed by [13]. He shows that this simple binary formulation simulates the
behavioral response of the taxpayers, and that its qualitative results are robust to the
introduction of more sophisticated and “realistic” expressions. Besides, it could also be
argued, due to the actual complexity of taxation systems, that high-income individuals can
more easily take advantage of tax avoidance than low-income individuals. For instance,
as [6] says, “hiring a tax consultant to file one’s tax return may only be profitable if one
has sufficiently high income”. Thus, even if this assumption could seem quite “crude”,
the introduction of more advanced behavioral hypotheses will not qualitatively change
the outcome, which is that the richer an individual is, the more he can benefit from tax
avoidance. For instance, we can show that the results presented in this paper hold under
an alternative modelling assumption. We assume (following [6]) that there exists two
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different technologies of tax avoidance: a cheap and inefficient one and other which is
more expensive and efficient. We assume every taxpayer can access both technologies. We
denote them by (δc, Ac) for the cheap technology and (δe, Ae) for the expensive one with
δc > δe and Ac < Ae. This formulation seems to be realistic as according to estimates 10
to 20 % of the population avoid from 10 to 20% of their official tax payments and a very
small fraction (less than 0.5 %) completely avoids taxes. This more subtle characterization
of the tax avoidance phenomenon will enhance the effects described on this work.
2.2 Quadratic tax functions
The next lemma is useful for the purpose of simplicity. The proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 Let t ∈ P and τ ∈ R. The intersection of both curves is denoted by θ ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, θ depends only on the income distribution F ∈ F and θ = µ2µ .
where µ2 stands for
∫
x2dF . Obviously, the intersection θ is lower bounded by m as shown
by [10]. The main aim of our formulation is to get an explicit formula.
Throughout this work, we will mostly use quadratic tax functions. In the case of
quadratic taxation schemes, i.e. t(x) = ax2 + bx, we can write that
xt =
1
2a(δ2 − 1)
(
b(1− δ)±
√
b2
(1− δ)2 +
4aA
1− δ2
)
This means that at any positive tax rate, there is a unique income, xt which splits the
population into two separate parts. Those with an income below xt pay full taxes, while
those with a higher income choose to avoid a share δ of their tax payment.
The following proposition characterizes the partial orderings of the critical incomes in
the case of quadratic taxation.
Proposition 2.1 Let E ∈ E and (t, τ) ∈ P ×R. Then, we can write that
1. xτ ≥ θ(1 + δ) =⇒ 0 ≤ xt ≤ xτ .
2. xτ <
θ
(1 + δ)
=⇒ 0 < xτ ≤ xt < θ1 + δ .
Proof: It is easy to see that xt and xτ verify the following equalities
a(1− δ2)x2t + b(1− δ)xt = A
c(1− δ2)x2τ + d(1− δ)xτ = A
Thus, comparing both income thresholds is equivalent to determining the intersections of
both quadratic curves with the line of equation y = A. However, we can interpret this
problem as follows. By assumption, we know that
aµ2 + bµ = cµ2 + dµ = r
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Thus, we can express the initial problem differently and we can write that xt and xτ verify
a(1− δ2)x2t + (
r − aµ2
µ
)(1− δ)xt = A
c(1− δ2)x2τ + (
r − cµ2
µ
)(1− δ)xτ = A
That is equivalent to
a[(1− δ2)x2t −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xt] + r
µ
(1− δ)xt =A
c[(1− δ2)x2τ −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xτ ] + r
µ
(1− δ)xτ =A
It should be noted that the following equivalence is true for i = t, τ :
(1− δ2)x2i −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xi ≥ 0⇐⇒ xi ≥ θ(1 + δ) .
Let us assume first that xτ ≥ θ(1+δ) and that xt > xτ . By assumption, we know that
a[(1− δ2)x2t −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xt] + r
µ
(1− δ)xt = c[(1− δ2)x2τ −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xτ ] + r
µ
(1− δ)xτ
which is equivalent to
a[(1− δ2)x2t −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xt]− c[(1− δ2)x2τ −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xτ ] = r
µ
(1− δ)(xτ − xt)
However, as we have assumed that xt > xτ , we know that the right side of this equality
is negative. Besides, as both xt and xτ are greater than θ(1+δ) , we can write that
a[(1− δ2)x2t −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xt] > 0
−c[(1− δ2)x2τ −
µ2
µ
(1− δ)xτ ] > 0
which implies that the left side of the equality is positive. This leads us to a con-
tradiction. Similarly, it can be proven that if xτ < θ(1+δ) , then the following inequality
holds,
0 ≤ xτ ≤ xt < θ1 + δ .
In order to show that there does not exist a tax avoidance technology (A, δ) such that
xτ <
θ
1+δ and xt >
θ
1+δ , we solve the following equation
a(1− δ2)x2t + b(1− δ)xt = c(1− δ2)x2τ + d(1− δ)xτ
which is equivalent to
xt =
−b+√b2 − 4a(1 + δ)(−dxτ − cx2τ (1 + δ))
2a(1 + δ)
as we know that xt ∈ [0, 1]. And, therefore, we can write that
xt − xτ > 0 =⇒ 0 < xτ < d− b(a− c)(1 + δ) =
θ
1 + δ
¤
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3 The voting game
Take any taxation environment E ∈ E , and consider two political parties who are engaged
in a competition to hold office. Each party proposes a mixed strategy over a finite number
of different taxation schemes which they will apply if elected. If party 1 proposes the tax
policy t and party 2 proposes τ , the share of individuals that strictly prefer t over τ in the
population is determined as
w(t, τ) = pF {x ∈ [0, 1] : t(x) < τ(x)}
Of course, in this case the share of individuals who strictly prefer the victory of party
2 is w(t, τ), following [3]. When tax avoidance is allowed, this is denoted as
w∗(t, τ) = w(t∗, τ∗) = pF {x ∈ [0, 1] : t∗(x) < τ∗(x)}
We assume parties’ purpose is to maximize their utility ui which is understood as the
popular support of the proposed taxation scheme. That is, we suppose that
ui(t, τ) =
{
w(t, τ)− w(τ, t) if i = 1
w(τ, t)− w(t, τ) if i = 2
By assumption, we consider that parties propose a finite number of taxation schemes.
This assumption is made in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium in the game. We
let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} represent the set of allowed taxation schemes. We assume that
sj ∈ P if j ∈ {1, . . . , n.}.
sj ∈ R if j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . ,m.}.
We let σ denote a typical mixed strategy, i.e., a probability measure over any finite
subset S ⊂ Q. Formally,
σ :S → [0, 1]
sj 7−→ σj
with σ(S) =
∑m
j=1 σ
j = 1 and σj ≥ 0 ∀ j. Therefore, the expected payoff to party 1
(similarly to party 2) from the mixed strategy pair (σ1, σ2) is
U1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
i,j
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
Therefore, we focus on the following two-person symmetric zero-sum game,
H = (σ1(Q)× σ2(Q), (U1, U2))
for some couple of mixed strategies (σ1, σ2). It is not a difficult task to show that this
zero-sum symmetric game does not always have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The
main objective is to characterize the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
As players face a zero-sum symmetric game, it is easy to see ( by min max) that if
the pair (σ1, σ2) constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of H, then for all mixed
strategies σˆ and for both players i = 1, 2,
Ui(σˆ, σ2) ≤ Ui(σ1, σ2)
Ui(σ1, σˆ) ≥ Ui(σ1, σ2)
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3.1 The effect of tax avoidance
The main objective in this section is to study the function w∗(t, τ), that accounts for the
popular support when tax avoidance is taken into consideration, and its relationship with
w(t, τ). Indeed, the following theorem summarizes the main intuition.
Theorem 3.1 For any taxation environment E ∈ E,
w∗(t, τ) ≥ w(t, τ) > 1/2 whenever (t, τ) ∈ P ×R
Theorem 3.1 enforces the result of Marhuenda and Ortun˜o Ort´ın [10] when voters are
allowed to avoid taxes. The proof is given in the appendix. Indeed, when individuals can
avoid taxes, the part of the population who vote for progressive taxes is higher than in
the status quo (without tax avoidance). As a first consequence of this theorem, we can
state the following corollary which will be helpful in the proof of the main theorem. No
proof is provided as it is a straightforward consequence of the previous result.
Corollary 3.1 Let E ∈ E and take any (σ1, σ2). If σ1(P) > 0 and σ2(R) > 0, then
n∑
i=0
m∑
j=n+1
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj) > 0
We now introduce one of the main results of this work. At equilibrium, both parties
propose progressive taxation schemes with probability one.
Theorem 3.2 For any taxation environment E ∈ E, there exists a mixed strategy equi-
librium of hE and for any equilibrium (σ1, σ2) of this game, we have
σ1(P) = 1 = σ2(P)
Proof: In this section, we show that the mixed strategy equilibria in hE are such that
progressive taxes are chosen with probability one.
Take a pair of probability distributions (σ1, σ2) over the set of strategies S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}.
Let us suppose that σ2(R) > 0, i.e. there exists a j ∈ {n + 1, . . . ,m} such that σj2 > 0
with (σ1, σ2) being a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Then we have 2 cases: either
U1(σ1, σ2) > 0 or U1(σ1, σ2) ≤ 0.
Suppose U1(σ1, σ2) > 0. Then U2(σ1, σ1) = 0 and U2(σ1, σ2) < 0, so (σ1, σ2) is not a Nash
equilibrium, as player 2 can increase her expected payoff by playing σ1 instead of σ2.
Suppose now that U1(σ1, σ2) ≤ 0 and σ2(P) = 0. Then,
U1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
i,j
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
=
∑
i
n∑
j=0
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj) +
∑
i
m∑
j=n+1
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
However, as we have assumed that σ2(P) = 0, we have σj2 = 0 ∀ j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Thus, we
can write that
U1(σ1, σ2) =
∑
i
m∑
j=n+1
σi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj) ≤ 0
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But, let us suppose that σj1 = 1 when j = j0 for some j0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} and σj1 = 0 elsewhere.
Then,
U1(σ1, σ2) =
m∑
j=n+1
σj2u1(si0 , sj)
But, we know from Theorem 3.1 that u1(si, sj) > 0 whenever si ∈ P and sj ∈ R. Thus,
we have that U1(σ1, σ2) > 0. So, σ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we turn to the case U1(σ1, σ2) ≤ 0 and σ2(P) > 0. Define the probability measure
ρ1 on Q by
ρj1 =
σi2∑n
j=0 σ
j
2
if j ∈ {0, . . . , n}
ρj1 = 0 if not
Observe that
U1(ρ1, σ2) =
∑
i,j
ρi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
=
n∑
i=0
m∑
j=0
ρi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
=
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
ρi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj) +
n∑
i=0
m∑
j=n+1
ρi1σ
j
2ui(si, sj)
>
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
ρi1σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
=
1∑n
i=0 σ
i
2
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
σi2σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
where the last inequality is a consequence of the corollary 3.1. Let us remark that, as H
is a symmetric zero-sum game, we can write that U(ρ1, ρ1) = 0. We can also write that
U1(ρ1, ρ1) =
1
(
∑n
i=0 σ
i
2)2
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
σi2σ
j
2u1(si, sj)
Finally, we can write that
U1(ρ1, σ2) > 0 ≥ U1(σ1, σ2)
where the last inequality holds by assumption. This is a contradiction, as by definition,
for any mixed strategy σˆ, if (σ1, σ2) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, we
have that
U1(σˆ, σ2) ≤ U1(σ1, σ2)
Therefore, the proof is complete. ¤.
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4 Breaking the cycle from the inside
Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007) propose an interesting example where, at equilibrium,
regressive taxes are chosen with a higher probability than progressive ones. The main intu-
ition of their counterexample is that, when introducing tax functions that “wiggle” in the
sense of being regressive on certain zones and progressive over others, the equilibrium out-
come of the game significantly changes, and in fact opens the door to regressive taxation.
The following example is analysed in their work in order to show that the admissibility of
“wiggling taxes” might even result in the emergence of regressive taxes in equilibrium. We
study the same game with the introduction of some tax avoidance technology (A, δ). As
will be shown, tax avoidance perturbs the equilibrium, erasing the fact that the highest
probability of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is put on the regressive tax. Indeed,
it leads to the election of marginally-progressive tax rates with probability 1 when this
phenomenon is significant enough.
Let r = 0.15 and consider a taxation environment (F, r) where F has the following density:
f(x) = 2− 2x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Consider the tax functions t1, t2 and t3 defined as follows,
t1(x) =
{
x
4 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 14
α(x− 14) + 116 if 14 < x ≤ 1
t2(x) =
{
x
2 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 14
β(x− 14) + 18 if 14 < x ≤ 1
and
t3(x) =
{
(4x)γ
8 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 14
x
2 if
1
4 < x ≤ 1
where α = 391540 , β =
103
270 and γ =
4
√
6
3 + 1. We know from [3] that w(t
1, t2) = 0.67 and
hence if the game was played with the action spaces of both parties reduced to {t1, t2},
then the unique mixed strategy equilibrium would be the one in which both parties choose
tax t1 with probability 1.
Now, consider the situation in which we also allow for a third, “wiggling”, tax function
t3. That is, the game is played with the action spaces of both parties being restricted to
{t1, t2, t3}. We know from [3] that w(t1, t3) = 0.41 and w(t2, t3) = 0.57. In this situation,
The unique mixed strategy equilibrium is ( 733 ,
9
33 ,
17
33). That is, as [3] emphasizes, “the
probability that the regressive tax would be proposed by a party is larger than that of the
progressive tax” at equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 Let E ∈ E with T = {t1, t2, t3}. Then tax avoidance introduces a dis-
turbance on the equilibrium which leads to the election of progressive taxes with probability
1, i.e. µ1(t1) = µ2(t1).
Proof: The main challenge of this example is that none of the tax schemes is a Condorcet
winner when tax avoidance is not allowed: t1 is socially preferred to t2, t2 is socially
preferred to t3, and t3 is socially preferred to t1, leading to a cycle. However, we claim
that if tax avoidance technology is present enough in society, this cycle can be broken.
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In order to show the effect of tax avoidance in the equilibrium, we keep computation
simple by focusing on the case where the income thresholds (xt1 , xt2 and xt3) are located
2
above 14 . Then, it is straightforward to show that
1
4
< xt1 < xt3 < xt2
First, it is easily verified that, due to the construction of t2 and t3, tax avoidance does
not affect popular support for this strategy couple, i.e. w∗(t2, t3) = w(t2, t3) as long as
1
4 < xt1 .
Second, we show that w∗(t1, t2) ≥ w(t1, t2) and that w∗(t1, t3) ≥ w(t1, t3) as long as
1
4 < xt1 .
The first matrix represents the game studied by [3]. For simplicity, the coefficients
within the matrix represent the payoffs of player 1. We evaluate the consequences of the
introduction of tax avoidance in the taxpayers choice.
t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.34 −0.18
t2 −0.34 0 0.14
t3 0.18 −0.14 0
We start by assuming that the tax avoidance parameters are equal to the ones estimated
by [13]. According to their estimations, the fixed cost A represents about 22% of the
average mean and the percentage of taxes paid is 80%. Given our income distribution, it
implies that A = 0.07333 and δ = 0.8. Then we have that w∗(t1, t2) = 0.67, w∗(t1, t3) =
0.45 and w∗(t2, t3) = 0.57.
t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.34 −0.10
t2 −0.34 0 0.14
t3 0.10 −0.14 0
The unique mixed strategy equilibrium is (0.241739, 0.172414, 0.586207). In equilibrium,
we see that the probability assigned to the regressive tax is lower than the one assigned
to the progressive one.
We now allow both parameters A and δ to vary slightly, in order to show that this
disturbance continues to exist and is even enforced.
4.1 Rising the efficiency
The tax avoidance parameters are such that A = 0.07333 and δ = 0.7895.
Then we have that w∗(t1, t2) = 0.67, w∗(t1, t3) = 0.5 and w∗(t2, t3) = 0.57.
2This assumption is realistic and not too restrictive. Indeed, F(1/4)=0.4375 and so there is at most
56% of the population who can avoid paying full taxes, in accordance with the estimations of [13].
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t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.34 0
t2 −0.34 0 0.14
t3 0 −0.14 0
The unique mixed strategy equilibrium is (0.291667, 0, 0.708333). In equilibrium, we see
that the lowest probability is placed, this time, on the regressive tax.
When the tax avoidance parameters are such that A = 0.07333, δ = 0.75, then we
have that w∗(t1, t2) = 0.71, w∗(t1, t3) = 0.55 and w∗(t2, t3) = 0.57. The unique strategy
equilibrium is to choose t1, the progressive tax with probability 1.
To sum up, the presence of tax avoidance changes the payoffs and the equilibrium of
the game. Indeed, as tax avoidance technology becomes more efficient, the game evolves
towards the following one:
t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.42 0.1
t2 −0.42 0 0.14
t3 −0.1 −0.14 0
Therefore, we know from [3] that at equilibrium, the only mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
is µ1(t1) = µ2(t1) = 1.
4.2 Decreasing the cost
The tax avoidance parameters are such that A = 0.06833 and δ = 0.8.
Then we have that w∗(t1, t2) = 0.67, w∗(t1, t3) = 0.5 and w∗(t2, t3) = 0.57.
t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.34 0
t2 −0.34 0 0.14
t3 0 −0.14 0
The unique mixed strategy equilibrium is (0.291667, 0, 0.708333). In equilibrium, we see
that the lowest probability is placed, this time, on the regressive tax.
When the tax avoidance parameters are such that A = 0.06333, δ = 0.8, then we
have that w∗(t1, t2) = 0.68, w∗(t1, t3) = 0.52 and w∗(t2, t3) = 0.57. The unique strategy
equilibrium is to choose t1, the progressive tax with probability 1.
Again, the presence of tax avoidance changes the game. Indeed, as tax avoidance
technology becomes less costly, the game evolves towards the following one:
t1 t2 t3
t1 0 0.36 0.04
t2 −0.36 0 0.14
t3 −0.04 −0.14 0
Therefore, we know from [3] that at equilibrium, the only mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
is µ1(t1) = µ2(t1) = 1.
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The following diagram illustrates the intuition of the present analysis. The income y
is plotted against the tax schemes t1 (continuous curve) and t2 (discontinuous curve). We
can see that the introduction of tax avoidance modifies the intersection of t1 and t2 and
therefore the game converges rapidly to a different one from that without tax avoidance
where the only equilibrium is to choose the progressive taxation scheme with probability
one.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have attempted to understand the role of tax avoidance when voting
over income taxation. Our main finding is that tax avoidance modifies the preferences of
the richest individuals and therefore introduces a disturbance on the equilibrium of the
political game. Indeed, we claim that tax avoidance has a clear effect: it increases the
tendency of the society to vote for progressive income taxation. However, the main limit
of our approach is to give an equilibrium version only for the case of quadratic taxation.
The next natural step will be to try to understand whether our claim is true in more
general environments.
As pointed out in the last section, tax avoidance leads us to restore the election of pro-
gressive taxes at equilibrium as soon as tax avoidance technology is close to the estimated
parameters of [13]. These estimates imply in our model around five percent of loss due to
the presence of tax avoidance. Using [4]’s estimates, which imply thirty percent of loss,
will increase this effect. This confirms our intuition: tax avoidance enhances the political
appeal of progressivity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Preliminary concepts
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Let t ∈ P and τ ∈ R. As they both belong to Qa, we can write that∫ 1
0
t(y)dF (y) =
∫ 1
0
τ(y)dF (y) = r
which implies that
aµ2 + bµ = cµ2 + dµ⇐⇒ (a− c) = µ2
µ
(d− b)
where µ =
∫ 1
0 xdF (x) and µ2 =
∫ 1
0 x
2dF (x). Denoting by θ the intersection between t and
τ , we can give an explicit formulation for θ that only depends on the income distribution.
Formally,
∃ θ ∈ (0, 1] s.t. t(θ) = τ(θ) =⇒ θ = d− b
a− c =
d− b
µ
µ2
(d− b) =
µ2
µ
> µ ¤.
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A.2 Proof of the Theorem 3.1.
For simplicity, we denote by θs the intersection between the modified taxation schemes t∗
and τ∗ in reference to the intersection θ between the proposed taxation schemes t and τ .
Case 1: When there exists neither xt nor xτ
In this case, both income thresholds are located either above the maximal income or
below the minimal one. Thus, the tax avoidance affects in the same way both taxation
schemes. Therefore, we are either in the status quo situation or in a case where all the
population avoids taxes. In the status quo situation, we have that,
t∗(y) = t(y) ∀ y ∈ [0, 1]
τ∗(y) = τ(y) ∀ y ∈ [0, 1]
Thus, as shown by Lemma 2.1, we have that the intersection θs = θ is located above m
and then w∗(t, τ) = w(t, τ) > 12 . In the situation where all the population avoids taxes,
the modified taxation schemes t∗ and τ∗ are such that:
t∗(y) = A+ t(δy) ∀ y ∈ [0, 1]
τ∗(y) = A+ τ(δy) ∀ y ∈ [0, 1]
Thus, the intersection θs is such that
t∗(θs) = τ∗(θs) =⇒ A+ t(δθs) = A+ τ(δθs)
=⇒ θs = θ
δ
> θ > m
So, we can write that w∗(t, τ) > w(t, τ) > 12 .
Case 2: When there exists both xτ and xt
Lemma A.1 Let E ∈ E and suppose xτ ≥ θ(1+δ) . We can write that w∗(t, τ) > w(t, τ) > 12
whenever (t, τ) ∈ P ×R.
Proof:
Case 1.1. Suppose first that xt > θ and so, xτ > θ. Then it is easy to show to write that
w∗(t, τ) ≥ w(t, τ).
Case 1.2. Suppose now that xτ > θ and xt < θ. If we show that t∗(θ) < τ∗(θ), we will be
done as the intersection between t∗ and τ∗ will take place after θ. But, given that xt < θ,
we can write
t∗(θ) = A+ t(δθ) < t(θ) = τ(θ) = τ∗(θ)
where the last equality comes from the fact that xτ > θ.
Case 2.1. Suppose now that xτ ∈ [ θ1+δ , θ]. As xτ < θ, we know that t(xτ ) < τ(xτ ), by the
definition of θ. However, by Proposition 2.1, we know that in this case, xt ≤ xτ . Thus,
we can write that
t∗(xτ ) = A+ t(δxτ ) < t(xτ ) < τ(xτ ) = τ∗(xτ )
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Therefore, τ∗(xτ ) > t∗(xτ ). This ensures the fact that the intersection takes place
between A+ t(δx) and A+ τ(δx). Thus, w∗(t, τ) > w(t, τ) > 12 . ¤.
Lemma A.2 Let E ∈ E and suppose xτ < θ(1+δ) . We can write that w∗(t, τ) > w(t, τ) > 12
whenever (t, τ) ∈ P ×R.
Proof:
As Proposition 2.1 shows, assuming that xτ < θ(1+δ) implies that xτ < xt <
θ
1+δ < θ.
However, by the definition of θ, we can write that
τ(xt) > t(xt)
Note that if we show that τ∗(xt) > t(xt), then the intersection will take place between
A + t(δy) and A + τ(δy). By definition, we know that t(xt) = A + t(δxt). Therefore, we
can write that
τ∗(xt) > t(xt)⇐⇒
A+ τ(δxt) > A+ t(δxt)⇐⇒
τ(δxt) > t(δxt)⇐⇒
which is straightforward, as δxt ∈ [0, θ].
Therefore, we can write that τ∗(xt) > t(xt) whenever xτ < θ(1+δ) .
Thus, the only possible intersection between t∗ and τ∗ which is denoted θs is the
solution to the equation
t(δθs) = τ(δθs)
Thus, w∗(t, τ) > w(t, τ) > 12 . ¤.
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Figure 1: The tax functions t1 and t2
Figure 2: The effect of tax avoidance in t1 and t2
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